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Abstract  
Expropriation risk has a binding effect on foreign direct investment (FDI). However, state-owned 
multinational corporation (MNCs) may counter the monopoly power of the host state by leveraging the 
political influence of their home government. The magnitude of this counter force, we argue, may vary, 
depending on the strength of political relations between the home and host state, and the level of 
economic dependence of the host country on the home market. We find supporting evidence of our 
hypotheses using Chinese firm level FDI information between 2003 and 2010.  
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State-Owned MNCs and Host Country Expropriation Risk:  
The Role of Home State Soft Power and Economic Gunboat Diplomacy 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The perils of expropriation risk on foreign direct investment (FDI) are well documented in the literature 
(Overholt, 1982; Eaton & Gersovitz, 1984; Caprio, Faccio, & McConnell, 2011). Recent survey data also 
shows that expropriation risk is the top concern for multinational corporations (MNCs) from both 
developed and developing countries alike, and far exceed other obstacles such as access to finance, rigid 
labor market regulations, and macroeconomic instability (World Bank, 2009, 42). The current literature 
has analysed how MNCs could adopt various strategies such as adjusting leverage level and equity control, 
employing advanced technologies, or using foreign aid to mitigate expropriation risk (Asiedu & Esfahani, 
2001; Asiedu, Jin & Nandwa, 2009; Kesternich & Schnittzer, 2010; Opp, 2012). We depart from these 
studies by focusing on a special type of MNCs, state-owned MNCs, and examining how international 
political factors can mitigate their exposure to expropriation risk. We are motivated by the research gap 
that there is relatively few systematic studies on the role of state-owned MNCs as new promoters of 
international business. The focus on conventional privately owned MNCs, mostly from western 
countries, has also marginalized the role of nation states and international political factors in influencing 
FDI (Murtha & Lenway, 1994).  
  
But history provides us with many examples that nation states leverage their political powers to promote 
commerce and other national interests (e.g. Findlay & O’Rourke, 2007; Berger, et al., 2013); and firms 
respond to political factors in their trade and FDI decisions (e.g. Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007; Li & 
Vashchilko, 2010). Recent financial crisis sweeping western world has in some ways made state ownership 
of enterprises less exceptional (Pargendler, 2012). According to a recent survey, state-owned-enterprises 
(SOEs) are now responsible for approximately one-fifth of global stock market value, which is more than 
twice the level observed just one decade ago (Economist, 2010). More notably, SOEs are becoming new 
and significant players in global markets. This provides us with an opportunity to understand how state 
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ownership and international political factors may extenuate the barriers of international investment, 
among which host country expropriation risk is the most binding one.    
 
Theoretically, we view the relationship between MNCs and host government as a special type of 
principal-agent nexus. The vulnerability of MNCs, as the principal, stems from the host government’s 
position as the monopoly of legitimate violence and the ultimate arbitrator of contracts in the host 
country (Acemoglu, 2003; Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005). However, when the MNC is a state-owned entity, 
the MNC acts as an agent on the behalf of its principal – its home government, which we argue, may help 
counter the power asymmetry between the MNC and the host government. The magnitude of the 
counter force may increase with the strength of home-host political relations because close political 
relations may reduce the potential benefit of host government expropriation. Conversely, when the host 
country relies on the home country as its export market, the home government may use economic 
coercion to elicit cooperative behaviour, thereby reducing the risk exposure of its SOEs.   
 
We base our empirical analysis on Chinese firms’ outward FDI. Despite large scale corporation in the 
1990s similar to other countries, China remains deeply committed to state ownership and control of 
enterprises. The conventional view of corporation strategy is that it is a first step in the transition towards 
private control of enterprise. The goal of the Chinese state was arguably the reverse, that is, to increase 
state control of economic activity through leverage and its long-term political survival (Clarke, 2003). 
Although the absolute number of SOEs has declined since privatization in the 1990s, today’s SOEs are 
more powerful and politically charged than ever1. The recent “go-global” campaign has forged massive 
state-owned and state-controlled national champions that are designed to be competitive on the 
international stage (Wooldridge, 2012).  In addition, China’s outward FDI is often portrayed as politically 
motivated. With phenomenal economic growth in the past decades, China is rapidly emerging as a 
significant economic as well as political power in an increasingly multi-polar world. Nevertheless, it 
remains to be a developing country and considers itself an advocate for developing countries. This may 
give the Chinese authority an unparalleled political leverage among developing countries, where the risk 
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of host expropriation tends to be high. As a result, China provides an ideal setting to study state-owned 
MNC and political factors on FDI. 
 
Using Chinese firm level greenfield FDI information between 2003 and 2010, we find that although 
expropriation risk reduces Chinese firms’ FDI, the negative impact is significantly and positively 
moderated by the level of state ownership in the enterprise. In addition, the level of state ownership 
induces firms to increase investment in countries with high expropriation risk but strong political 
relations with China, or high export dependency on the Chinese market. Our findings support a political 
economy based argument that in a bilateral context, inter-state relations can have an institutional function 
compensating the lack of credible government commitment. The research therefore adds to the growing 
literature in international business (IB) area on the relationship between ownership structure and firms’ 
internationalization (Fernandez & Nieto, 2006; Filtotchev, Strange, Piesse, & Lien, 2007; Bhaumik, 
Driffield, & Pal, 2010; Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012), and on international political factors on 
FDI flows (e.g. Nigh, 1985; Li & Vashchilko, 2010; Biglaiser & Lektzian, 2011). 
 
We structure the remainder of the paper as follows. We introduce the theoretical background and develop 
our hypotheses in Section two. We explain our empirical strategy in Section three. Our empirical results 
are reported in Section four. We discuss policy and managerial implications in Section five.  
 
 
2 THEORIES AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Theoretical background  
We define expropriation risk as the deficiencies of a country’s protection of private property rights, 
especially their protection against government expropriation (De Long & Shleifer, 1993; Jones, 1981; 
Olson, 2000). Expropriation occurs when a host government interferes with a foreign investor’s 
fundamental ownership rights. This can take the form of a direct seizure of assets or it can be through a 
series of discriminatory actions, often called “creeping expropriation” (Kesternich & Schnitzer, 2010). 
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Based on the predatory theory of the state (North, 1981), the state is an instrument for transferring 
resources from one group to another. Property rights institutions are intimately linked to the distribution 
of political power in society. When property rights institutions fail to constrain those who control the 
state, it is not possible to circumvent the ensuring problems by writing alternative contracts to prevent 
future expropriation.  
 
In this view, when an MNC sets up a subsidiary in a host country, it also steps into, implicitly or explicitly, 
a contract with the host state under which the host state is expected to protect and refrain from 
expropriating the MNC’s local operations (Asiedu, Jin & Nandwa, 2009). The vulnerability of foreign 
MNCs stems not only from the incomplete nature of the contract that cannot anticipate all future 
contingencies (Bull, 1987; Levin, 2003), but also the fact that the state holds the final arbitration power on 
contracts (North, 1981; Acemoglu, 2003; Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005). As Djankov et al (2003) succinctly 
summed up: state powerful enough to enforce contracts and secure property rights can also use this 
power for its own benefit. In comparison to the power concentrated in the typical national government, 
there is no equivalent at the international level, limiting the extent to which national governments can be 
punished for violations of contractual obligations (Opp, 2012). Consequently, unchecked government 
opportunism will dampen transactions that are transnational. Expropriation risk has a profound negative 
impact on FDI compared to other types of international investment because much of the costs associated 
with FDI are sunk and therefore cannot be recouped if disinvestment occurs (Asiedu, Jin, & Nandwa, 
2009). Although outright expropriation has become rare in recent decades (Li, 2009), there is a wide range 
of government policies that can reduce the profitability of foreign investment. Therefore, variations in the 
credibility of government commitment to particular policy frameworks, or in the stability of the 
institutions that support those commitments may explain variations of foreign direct investment (North 
& Thomas, 1973; North & Weingast, 1998).  
 
What the literature has not tackled is that when the MNC is owned by a state, instead of a private 
investor, the power asymmetry between the MNC and the host government can be substantially reduced. 
In addition, the magnitude of risk-reduction of home government may vary across inter-state political and 
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economic relations. Therefore, we integrate the inter-state relational context into firms’ FDI decisions. 
We proceed to develop our hypotheses in details.  
 
2.2. Hypothesis development 
The importance of examining the causal linkage between firm’s ownership structure and their 
internationalization strategies rests on micro-firm theories that different types of ownership arrangement 
render agents with different risk preference and decision-making horizon (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Past research focuses on the internal governance structure giving rise to different sets of incentives and 
abilities that influence firms’ internationalization with respect to foreign (Filatotchev et al., 2008), family 
(Bhaumik, Driffield, & Pal, 2010), and corporate ownership (Lien et al., 2005; Fernandez & Nieto, 2006). 
We complement the literature by analysing why, in their FDI decisions, state-owned MNCs may respond 
to expropriation risk in different ways from their private counterparts. 
 
When an MNC invests in a host country, its relationship with the host government can be viewed as a 
type of principal-agent nexus, under which the MNC has the responsibility to achieve its owner’s business 
goals and the host government should provide institutional support for the MNC (or more precisely, the 
local subsidiary, which we view as an integrated part of MNC) to operate. Agency costs may arise when 
the host government prefers to expropriate (the subsidiary of) the foreign MNC due to political 
opportunism and short-term benefits (Tomz, 1997), namely, its interest diverges from that of the 
principal. The MNC could reduce the agency costs by aligning its local operation with the economic or 
political agenda of the host government, or by breaking the investment into several stages, thus turning it 
into an on-going interaction in which host country credibility may be easier to achieve. But it cannot 
eliminate such risk because of the sovereign status of national governments. The lack of international 
governance, especially with respect to FDI, means that MNCs have little recourse when facing host 
expropriation. However, when the MNC is owned by a home state instead of a private investor, it could 
leverage the political influence of its home government. Being the principal of its SOEs, the home 
government should have incentive as well as ability to legitimately retaliate the host government in case of 
expropriation. Therefore, the dual role of state-owned MNCs, one being the principal of the assets and 
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facilities of the foreign operation, and the other being the agent of their home government for 
undertaking FDI abroad, reduces the power asymmetry between the MNCs and a host government. This 
can significantly increase the cost of expropriation for the host government, and consequently reduce risk 
exposure for state-owned MNCs.  
 
Our micro-based analysis is consistent with numerous discussions in the literature. For example, SOEs 
often have non-economic goals that distinguish them from profit-maximizing private business (Ellstrand, 
Tiyanyi, & Johnson, 2002). The political agenda of the state may compel SOEs to engage in risky FDI to 
fulfil political missions, such as securing energy to fuel domestic economic growth, accessing advanced 
technologies, and increasing geopolitical influence (Chen, 2008; Gill & Reilly, 2007).  Therefore, SOEs’ 
FDI could operate as the spearheads of a developmental and geopolitical vision that emanates primarily 
from the central state (Gozales-Vincente, 2001). For example, Chinese state investment has been active in 
developing world-class refining facilities in partnership with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
(OPEC) countries to secure energy supply for China’s economic growth. Several members such as 
Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela receive large sum of Greenfield FDI by Chinese SOEs in 
infrastructure and extraction industry despite high level of expropriation risk in these countries (World 
Bank, 2008). The risk-aversion that usually characterizes private business has to give way to non-
economic goals that the state places on SOEs. These state-imposed goals will justify the state to provide 
more direct intervention and supervision to facilitate SOEs’ internationalization. This is consistent with 
the political capability argument that SOEs have privileged access to or direct ties with pivotal political 
actors in their home country, which will give them more information, experience, and resources to 
develop specific routines both to identify risk ex ante and to influence political actors to mitigate 
expropriation risk ex post (Delios & Henisz, 2003; Holburn & Zelner, 2010). In case of expropriation, the 
home state, as the ultimate principal of its SOEs, will have strong financial and political incentives to 
build a reputation as a retaliatory principal, in order to avoid expensive future SOE bailouts (Knutsen, 
Rygy, & Hveem, 2011). Therefore, our first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: State ownership positively moderates the negative impact of expropriation risk on the firm’s FDI.  
 
8/36 
 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the risk-reduction function of the home state may vary, depending on the 
strength of home-host political relations. This is because, by definition, FDI flows from an origin to a 
destination country. The “bilateral” context may have an externality on the calculus of host government 
decision of expropriation. We propose two relational mechanisms which the home government can 
leverage to reduce host expropriation. The first is the political relations between the two countries, which 
give the home country a soft power in discouraging host expropriation. The second is economic coercion 
that the home government is able to expose on the host government, which can, to various degrees, 
dissuade host expropriation. We discuss them in order.  
 
Past research finds that the strength of political ties between a home-host pair has a direct and positive 
impact on bilateral trade (Morrow, Silverson, & Tabaresem, 1998; Pollins, 1989; Boehmer, Gartzke, & Li, 
2001) and FDI flows (Nigh, 1985; Li & Vashchilko, 2010). We argue that, in addition to this direct 
impact, bilateral political relations have an indirect impact on FDI through its interaction with host 
expropriation risk. Cole and English (1992) theorize that host government expropriation of foreign assets 
tends to arise in two circumstances: one is that when the government places a high value on access to the 
assets and resources controlled by MNCs in economic recession, and the other is that when it places a 
high value on the return of foreign assets in economic boom. We infer that for both circumstances, 
amicable political relations will ex ante mitigate expropriation tendency of the host state. Amicable political 
relations facilitate home and host government dialogue and support that can reduce desperate 
expropriation arising from economic hardship in the host state. Countries with amicable political relations 
will also have more established trust through past interactions, which should reduce opportunism impulse 
of the host state. In addition, political relations may dissuade expropriation ex ante by reducing ex post 
gains that the host government can draw from expropriation. This is because when the two countries 
have amicable political relations, the potential gains of expropriation will be cut short by the damage that 
it will cause to the political relationships. Conversely, the negative externality of expropriation on bilateral 
relations would be negligible when the bilateral relations are hostile. Therefore, amicable bilateral political 
relations could be a natural mechanism to palliate potential predation of the host country.  
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The support of a home government using its political relations to reduce its firms’ risk exposure is not 
unconditional, but should depend on the relationship between the firm and the state (Bucheli & Aguilera, 
2010). We propose that SOEs may stand to benefit more from such soft power than their private 
counterparts. SOEs are the economic extensions of state institutions. Their success is more critical to 
realize the state political and strategic missions home and abroad. Host country governments also tend to 
perceive SOEs as the wings of their home state in addition to commercial organizations, therefore may 
strive to build a positive relationship with them to enhance potential economic and political gains. For 
example, China state-owned oil company Sinopec commented that although there was prevailing political 
risk they have to deal with in Sudan and other African countries, the backing of the Chinese government 
provided them with confidence that political risk was a problem to be solved through diplomacy (Downs, 
2007). Taylor (2006) and Ellis (2011) document that there is growing perception among African and Latin 
American nations that Chinese state-owned firms are granted special favours and protections by various 
host governments that are unavailable to other MNCs. It is apparent that the advantageous position 
accorded by political relations is more accessible to those with formidable political ties (Hellman et al., 
2003). Our second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2: the strength of home-host political relations positively moderates the negative impact of expropriation risk on 
firms’ FDI. The moderation effect is greater for SOEs.  
 
Apart from close political relations that would provide state-owned MNCs with political shield from 
expropriation risk, political science has a long history to study that nation states could deploy their 
“coercive” power to constrain the behaviour and decisions of other countries (e.g. Beron, Murdoch, & 
Vijverberg, 2003). Economic coercions are an important part of statecraft that can work more effectively 
than military actions in the context of increasing economic globalization (Drezner, 2003). With respect to 
potential expropriation risk in the host country, a home country can attempt to elicit cooperation from a 
host government and increase the credibility of the host’s commitments to its national’s property rights 
by lengthening the shadow of the future with economic coercion. This not only can correct the time 
inconsistency problem facing the host government in relation to FDI, but also constrain the host state’s 
excess power. Coercion requires some level of common interest between the two sides as well as a level 
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of asymmetry of common interest between countries since if both sides can use their common interest to 
impose equal costs on each other, neither side can benefit from threatening to damage the link between 
them. For the sender to be able to engage in coercion effectively, the target must be more vulnerable to 
the disruption of the sender-target relationship. This is what Schelling theorized in his discussion of 
deterrence: coercion is “as inapplicable to a situation of pure and complete antagonism of interest as it is 
to the case of pure and complete common interest” (1960:11).  
 
Based on this theoretical insight, we suggest that export dependency of the host country on the home 
market represents a powerful and credible threat that the home government can leverage to protect its 
FDI. Trade ties are the most common economic links among national economies. The interdependence 
among nations is often asymmetrical. This may explain the wide application of trade ties as a foreign 
policy tool by some governments, especially of large countries, to influence the political decisions of 
trading partners (Askari, Forrer, Yang, & Hachem, 2005). For example, as the leading trade sanction 
country, the U.S. imposed various trade sanctions against countries such as Cuba, Burma, China, Iran, 
Libya, Sudan and Syria for a wide range of reasons including geopolitical considerations, national security, 
human rights, democratization issues, domestic politics, and of course, commercial interests. With the 
increasing globalization, many countries, not just powerful ones, choose to use trade ties to reward or 
punish other countries. For instance, Telam, Argentina’s official news outlet reported that Ministry 
officials have asked some 20 companies to cease importing materials from the U.K. in response to 
diplomatic tensions over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands (BBC, 2012).  More importantly, successful 
threats need not to be executed (Drezner, 2003). The sanctions literature has recognized the incentives 
for the sender and the target to reach a compromise before sanctions impositions: such a compromise 
would allow the two sides to avoid inefficient economic conflict (Eaton, 1999). Therefore, economic 
coercion is more likely to end at the threat stage than the imposition stage so that the sender achieves its 
goals due to the coercive effect of threats (Eaton & Engers, 1992).  
 
It is noted that the deployment of threat or an execution of an economic sanction is not without cost to 
the source country (Shon, 2011). In particular, trade sanctions may affect trade by altering an important 
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element of the nations’ comparative advantage (Farmer, 2000). Imposing restrictions or bans on imported 
goods and services can also reduce the base for future economic growth (Lucas & Griswold, 2003). Past 
research has generated much debate with regards to the efficacy, ethical, and humanitarian implications of 
economic sanctions (e.g. Hass, 1997). The negative externality for domestic actors may therefore raise the 
challenge for and limit the deployment of economic gunboat diplomacy (Skalnes, 2000; Davis, 2008/09). 
However, the state ownership of enterprises may address this problem by lowering domestic opposition. 
Considering the government is the principal of its SOEs, represents the interest of all citizens of the 
country, and the overseas activities of SOEs tend to carry objectives critical to national security and 
economic growth, there may be less domestic opposition for the home government to leverage economic 
threat/sanction to protect its SOEs’ properties and interests abroad. 
 
Relating to China, although China politically denounces economic sanctions, its rising economic powers 
have witnessed a subtle but significant shift in its use of economic gunboat diplomacy (Reilly, 2012). For 
instance, France, the United States, and Japan saw a two-year drop in their exports to China after their 
leaders met with the Dalai Lama in recent years (Fuchs & Klann, 2013). China halted fresh salmon 
imports from Norway after the Nobel Committee awarded its Peace Prize to Chinese human rights 
activities Liu Xiaobo in 2012 (South China Morning Post, 2013). Therefore, we propose the third 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The export dependence of the host country on the home market positively moderates the negative impact of 
expropriation risk on firms’ FDI. The moderation effect is greater for SOEs. 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Research data  
We use Chinese firm level greenfield investment in the period of 2003 and 2010 to test our hypotheses. 
The data is drawn from fDi Market of Financial Times, which tracks the global greenfield FDI. There are 
1,485 FDI projects undertaken by Chinese firms in this period. The dataset records the amount of the 
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investment, the location, and the year of investment. We removed 32 investments into Hong Kong and 
Macao from the sample because they are a part of China; data on their political relations with China are 
unavailable. We sought parent information from Global Business, GTA Information Technology (GTA), 
which is a commercial database company based in Hong Kong. We matched 894 observations for which 
parent information is available.  
 
3.2 Variables and measurement 
We use the natural log of the amount of investment as the dependent variable to indicate the scale of the 
FDI. Expropriation risk is measured by the property right protection index constructed by the Heritage 
Foundation. The index is reversed to ensure higher values indicate higher expropriation risk. The values 
range between 95 and 5. Therefore, we expect a negative coefficient to support the baseline argument that 
expropriation risk reduces FDI. Countries with highest expropriation risk in our sample include 
Zimbabwe, Vietnam, Iran, North Korea and Turkmenistan, with values higher than 80. Denmark, 
Switzerland, Germany, U.S. and U.K. are the countries with lowest expropriation risk; all having values 
lower than 10. State ownership is measured by the % of state equity in the firm. The average state 
ownership in our sample is 24%. This includes 526 firms without state equity.  For the remaining 358 
firms with state equity, the average state ownership is 58%, indicating a high level of equity control over 
the enterprises.  
 
Data of political relations is provided by Gartzke (2008)2. The index is measured by the distance between 
United Nations General Assembly votes for a given bilateral pair and year. Specially, it is measured by 1-
(2*d/dmax) where d is the sum of the distance between votes for a given bilateral pair and year, and 
dmax is the maximum possible distance between votes for a given bilateral pair and year. The distance 
between votes is calculated by first classifying “Yes” votes equal to one and “No” votes equal to zero. 
Then for each vote the distance is calculated as the absolute value of the differences in votes. The index 
values between -1 and 1 for all countries with higher values indicating stronger/better political 
relationships. We extract all pairwise information for China. The underlying idea of using this index is that 
countries with good relations are more likely to share similar policy positions, which should be reflected 
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in the voting patterns in the Assembly. It is also based on direct measure of government behaviour. This 
index is used in recent finance research such as Knill, Lee, & Mauk (2012). To our knowledge, we are the 
first to use this data to study FDI. In our dataset, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
North Korea and Iran are the top five countries with strongest political ties with China, all having a value 
of over 0.95. The expropriation risk of these countries except for Democratic Republic of Congo for 
which the data is unavailable, however, is around 80 out of 95 on average, making them the most risky 
environments for FDI in the world. There are some illuminating examples in our dataset that show how 
political relations can sway Chinese SOEs’ massive investment in these risky countries. For example, 
China Petrol and Chemical (Sinopec) invested US$ 300 million in Saudi Arabia in 2004 in extraction 
industry. China Natural Oil and Gas Exploration and Development (CNODC) invested US$ 3,600 in 
Iran in extraction industry in 2007. A Tianjin based SOE Huiming invested US$ 100 million in 
manufacturing sector in Egypt in 2007.  
 
We draw export data from IMF to measure export dependence of other countries on China. It is 
measured by the ratio of the country’s export to China to its total export to the world. Mongolia scores 
the highest with an average value of staggering 53% of export dependence on China during the period. 
Other countries heavily relying on the Chinese market as their export destination include Angola (34%), 
North Korea (32%), Democratic Republic of Congo (29%), Cuba (27%), and Sudan (24%). These 
countries also score poorly in terms of expropriation risk with an average of 80. But they managed to 
attract large investments from Chinese SOEs, such as Sinopec’ investment of over 20 million US$ in 
Angola in 2007 and several SOEs’ investment in telecommunication sector in Angola and Cuba.   
 
The country level control variables are as follows. We indicate the host country’s economic size by its GDP. 
Market access is the most widely acknowledged motive of FDI, and empirically has obtained the most 
unanimous confirmation (Chakrabarti, 2001). Anecdotal information has suggested that Chinese FDI is 
market motivated. For example, there has been excessive competition, reducing margins and overcapacity 
in many industries in China, which have spurred companies to invest abroad with a view to creating an 
overseas-based platform from which to gain access to local markets (Global Insight, 2006). To show the 
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wealth level of the host country we use GDP per head as a proxy variable; this also captures market 
potential. Corporate tax is included because it is argued to be a negative influence on MNCs’ activities 
(Dunning, 2006). But corporate tax is also a good indicator of public infrastructure provision, which can 
attract new investment, especially when the new investment tends to receive tax exemptions. This makes 
prevailing corporate tax less important in the short term. We also consider the unemployment rate of the 
host country. A higher unemployment rate not only means that new FDI is more welcome in the host 
country, but also facilitates MNCs’ recruitment (e.g. Basile, Castellanic, & Zanfei, 2008). Natural resources 
have been extensively discussed to be one of the motives of China’s outward FDI, although a more refined 
analysis shows that natural resources only matter in some resource-related industries (De Beule & Duanmu, 
2012). But we include this to consider the general trend, especially for FDI undertaken by SOEs. Exchange 
rate is considered because a high foreign exchange reserve and strong Reminbi means greater purchasing 
power abroad, which could be another incentive for outbound investment (Cushman, 1985). With the 
economic crisis depressing asset prices worldwide, and the Chinese government promoting outward FDI 
by easing and decentralizing regulatory procedures, broadening financing channels for firms with overseas 
ambitions (Rosen & Henemann, 2009), Chinese firms have advantages when purchasing, acquiring 
distressed resource firms or setting up new business abroad. We also include geographic distance as a 
common controller in FDI models, despite its ambiguous impact on FDI (e.g. Carr, Markusen, & Maskus, 
2001). We also have several firm level control variables that we gathered from GTA database. These are 
fixed assets, age of the firm, profit value (Yuan) scaled by number of employees, and export value (Yuan) 
scaled by number of employees. Past studies have demonstrated that these factors influence the decisions 
on, and the scale of, FDI (Asiedu & Esfahani 2001; Buch, Kleinert, Lipponer, & Toubal, 2005; Javorcik & 
Spatareanu, 2005). All independent 
Variables are one year lagged.  
 
3.3. Regression model  
We are dealing with cross-sectional data where each FDI observation enters the data only once. We write 
the following equation: 
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The equation models the scale of FDI by firm i in the host country k in the year t. The s term is an index 
for the 4-digit industry classification. We have 52 industries in the sample. The k term is an index for the 
host country. We have 104 host countries in the sample. The t term is an index for the year. We have 8 
years in total. The right-hand side of the equation lists the variables representing our key interests, which 
includes expropriation risk, and its various interactive terms with state ownership, political relations, and 
export dependence.  
 
Due to the fact that our data are drawn from two sources, this has resulted in some sample attribution 
(number of observations from 1485 to 894) that may not be random. To investigate potential bias, we use 
a simple t test to check variables such as the amount of FDI and country level controls. We do not find 
systematic difference between the missing observations (n=591) and the available observations (n=894). 
We then perform the Heckman correction models (1976) where two equations are developed - one for 
selection and the other for the dependent variable. These two equations are estimated simultaneously. This 
method is a two-step estimator model where a probit estimation of the selection model is used in the 
primary regression model to test if there is a significant selection bias (Berk, 1983). We use industry, year, 
and host country variables to estimate the selection model to check if the observations that are not included 
in our main models are systematically different from those that are included in main models. It is noted 
that the two-stage estimator method only outperforms an ordinary least squares (OLS) method if selection 
bias is severe (Berk, 1983). In our test, neither is the sample selection bias significant not do the regression 
coefficients substantially differ between the two-step estimator and the OLS models. Consequently, we use 
OLS regression models with robust standard errors in our estimations. Table 1 presents the descriptive 
statistics for the main variables and their definitions. The correlation matrix is presented in Table 2.  
 
𝑌∗(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑠𝑡+1) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑡  + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑂𝐸+𝛽3 𝑆𝑂𝐸 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑡  
  + 𝛽4 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑡* 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
  +𝛽6 𝑆𝑂𝐸 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑡* 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽7 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 
  + 𝛽8 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑡  
  +𝛽9 𝑆𝑂𝐸 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑡  
  +∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑠𝑡
𝑗=11
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝜔𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑦=8
𝑦=1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
𝑟=52
𝑟=1 + 𝑠𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑠𝑡  
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*** Insert Table 1 about here*** 
*** Insert Table 2 about here*** 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The results relating to our first hypothesis are presented in Table 3. In model 1, we find that 
expropriation risk is a statistically significant and negative estimator. This is in line with the conventional 
argument that MNCs reduce investment in host countries with high expropriation risk. This result 
remains unchanged when we include year and industry fixed effects in model 2. It is noted that when we 
include industry and year fixed effects we tend to lose some observations due to a lack of variations 
across some industries or years. In model 3, we test whether state ownership reduces Chinese firms’ 
aversion to host country’s expropriation risk. We find supporting evidence: the interactive term of state 
ownership is a statistically significant and positive estimator , confirming the first hypothesis that state 
ownership positively moderates Chinese firms’ concern over expropriation risk. This result holds when 
we include year and industry fixed effects as shown in model 4.  
 
*** Insert Table 3 about here*** 
 
In Table 4, we assess whether strong political relations reduce Chinese firms’ aversion to expropriation 
risk, and whether state ownership accelerates the benefit. In model 1 and model 2, we find that the 
interactive term of expropriation risk and political relations attains a statistically significant and positive 
result and expropriation risk remains a statistically significant and negative estimator. This confirms the 
second hypothesis that Chinese firms are less concerned about expropriation risk in countries with strong 
political relations with China. To examine if SOEs benefit more than their private counterparts, we split 
the sample into two based on whether or not the firm has state ownership. We find that the interactive 
term attains a statistically significant and positive result in model 3 with a coefficient of 0.041. In model 4, 
this interactive term remains statistically significant but the coefficient drops to 0.005. Since expropriation 
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risk has a coefficient of 0.009 in SOE sample, and -0.022 in non-SOE sample, the net effect for state 
ownership is 0.032 and for non-SOEs is 0.027.  We interpret that the risk reduction benefit is higher for 
SOEs than for non-SOEs. We also implement several estimations by using 25% and 50% of state 
ownership as the cut-off point to assess the robustness of our core results. Our results remain 
qualitatively unaltered.  
 
*** Insert Table 4 about here*** 
 
We then examine whether export dependence mitigates Chinese firms’ aversion to host country 
expropriation risk. In Table 5, model 1 finds that expropriation risk remains a statistically significant and 
negative estimator, consistent with previous results. However, the interactive term of export dependence 
and expropriation risk does not attain statistically significant result in model 1. The negative coefficient is 
contrary to our expectation. In model 2, we include year and industry fixed effects, and find that the 
results remain unchanged. We then split the sample into two. In SOE sample, we find that this interactive 
term becomes statistically significant with a positive coefficient, suggesting that SOEs benefit from the 
economic power that the Chinese state holds over host countries. But in non-SOE sample, the results 
remain largely unchanged from the main results reported in model 1 and model 2. The interactive term is 
a statistically insignificant and negative estimator in this subsample, suggesting that non-SOEs do not 
become less concerned over expropriation risk in countries with high export dependence on China. Our 
third hypothesis therefore receives partial support, that is, the risk-reduction function of export 
dependence only accrues to SOEs but not to their private counterparts. We implement several 
estimations by using 50% and 25% of state ownership as the cut-off point to assess the robustness of our 
core results. Our results remain consistently unchanged. 
 
*** Insert Table 5 about here*** 
*** Insert Table 6 about here*** 
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We report our final analysis in Table 6 where we put all our key variables in the models to check our 
results. We find that in model 1 expropriation risk is a negative and significant estimator, and its 
interactive term with state ownership is a statistically significant and positive estimator. This means that 
state ownership significantly reduces firms’ concern over expropriation risk in the host state. We show 
the interactive effect in Graph 1 where low state ownership and high state ownership are plotted together 
to see how state ownership reduces the negative impact of expropriation risk on FDI. We graph the 
slopes for investment on expropriation risk while holding the value of the moderator, state ownership, 
constant at either a high value (mean + 1standard deviation) or a low value (mean – 1standard deviation) 
using the method or re-centering. The second hypothesis that Chinese firms are less concerned over the 
expropriation risk in countries with strong political relations is confirmed by the interactive variable of 
expropriation risk and political relations. It demonstrates a political power enabled “comparative 
advantage” that Chinese firms have in these environments. More importantly, SOEs appear to benefit 
even more than non-state firms as shown by the triple interactive term. Using re-centering method, we 
show the interactive effect of political relations in Graph 2 by holding it constant at either a low or a high 
value. We also demonstrate how SOEs and non-SOEs respond in different ways in Graph 3 and Graph 4 
respectively.   
 
With respect to the third hypothesis, export dependence appears to be a statistically insignificant and 
positive estimator, and its two-way interactive term with expropriation risk is a negative and insignificant 
estimator in model 1. This suggests that Chinese firms do not invest more in countries with high risk but 
also high export dependence on the Chinese market. That is, part of the third hypothesis does not receive 
support. The three way interactive term of expropriation risk, export dependence and state ownership 
receives a statistically insignificant and positive result in model 1. We continue to subject the test with the 
inclusion of year and industry fixed effects in model 2 and model 3. Most results remain unchanged 
except that the triple interactive term of expropriation risk, export dependence and state ownership 
receives a statistically significant and positive result in model 3, suggesting that SOEs increase their FDI 
in countries with high level of expropriation risk but strong export dependence on China. This lends 
support to our hypothesis that SOEs benefit from the economic power that Chinese government has 
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over states with high expropriation risk but high export dependence on China. Therefore these results 
lend partial support to our third hypothesis. The two way interactions of expropriation risk and export 
dependence is presented in Graph 5 although the result is not what we expect. We also show how SOEs 
and non-SOEs respond differently in Graph 6 and Graph 7.  
 
 
5. DISCUSSIONS 
 
We have provided theoretical argument and empirical evidence to demonstrate how political factors 
influence firms’, especially SOEs’ FDI, in countries with high expropriation risk. We find that political 
relations between the home (e.g. China) and the host state serve as a risk reduction device to mitigate 
firms’ exposure to expropriation risk. Both SOEs and private firms benefit, but SOEs benefit more. 
However, in terms of the host country’s export dependence on the home market, only SOEs benefit 
from this economic power held by the home government. The beneficial impact is absent among private 
firms across various estimations. We speculate that with respect to private firms, the differential 
institutional function of the two types of bilateral relations arises possibly as a result of different 
information asymmetry, that is, the information on the strength of political relations between the home 
and the host countries is more accessible, which guides their FDI decisions. In comparison, the 
information of to what extent the host states rely on the home market as their export destination may be 
less disseminated. Another reason could be: private firms perceive that political relations, despite being 
“informal”, could be more effective to reduce their risk exposure. Without strong political support, 
private firms may not expect that its home government will leverage the more formal retaliatory measure 
to protect their overseas interest.   
 
Our results have significant implications to theory and practice. It is widely recognized that economic 
globalization requires market-supporting institutions to flourish. But unlike trade and monetary relations, 
virtually no multilateral rules of FDI exist. From the host country’s perspective, our findings suggest that 
if building up secure property right institutions is prohibitively time-consuming and costly, then external 
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forces, such as bilateral political and economic relations can provide a temporary avenue to reduce 
investors’ concern over expropriation risk. From this point of view, China’s outward FDI, especially 
SOEs’ FDI, fills in the voids left by most western multinationals which may be more constrained by their 
shareholders and a lack of effective political and/or economic protection from expropriation risk. But by 
no means does it suggest that it is the optimal outcome for the host country since SOEs from politically 
powerful nations may not be the most efficient user of resources of the host country.  
 
In addition, the political influence provided by a home state in protecting its MNCs’ investment, in 
essence, is a private provision of governance - private to firms, or a group of firms, from a particular 
home country. It does not substitute a public provision of global governance that hinges on collective 
actions by all nation states. In addition, the risk-reduction impact of bilateral political and economic 
relations may also mask the real impact of expropriation risk on FDI, reducing host countries’ incentive 
to improve their risk profile (Asiedu, Jin, & Nandwa, 2009). This may, in the long-term, contribute to a 
segmented increase of south-south FDI, led primarily by state owned MNCs due to their political power, 
but not truly global capital integration. Such segmentation can deepen if the southern FDI receipt 
countries are small enough to be satisfied with their development need by FDI from large developing 
countries like China, which will hamper their ability and incentive to attract more FDI from diverse 
sources. This may make these countries overly rely on southern FDI, but to the advantage of the 
incumbent investors facing less competition from new investors. On a positive side, if such segmented 
FDI flow can gradually lead these countries to improve their institutions to a higher standard, then it 
becomes merely a step towards a greater integration into the world economy. But to achieve this, the 
source countries, such as China, would have responsibilities to disseminate better international norms and 
bring these countries to higher standards, which may be counter to their benefit, or their own traditions. 
 
From investors’ point of view, Chinese firms, especially SOEs, need to consider whether the risk 
reduction role of political relations and purchasing diplomacy between China and the host country can be 
long-lasting to support their long-term and often immobile operations in the host country. Ultimately, it is 
the long-term investment return that can sustain the growth of these FDI projects and contribute to the 
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host country’s development. Chinese firms including SOEs are relatively newcomers in the global 
marketplace. Few are making profits. While the initial investment is only one of the first decisions that 
firms have to make, the success of their on-going operations will depend on how they integrate their 
business practices with the host country’s economic need to ensure a win-win and sustainable 
development for both sides involved.  
 
In the triangle relations between the SOE, its home government and the host government, it is intuitive 
to discuss how the SOE may leverage the influence of its principal, its home government, to deter the 
expropriation impulse of the agent, the host government. But we cannot rule out that the SOE may 
collude with the host bureaucrats in order to avoid being expropriated, but at the expense of the home 
state. Alternatively, a powerful home state may capture the policy making in the host country to a degree 
exceeding the necessity to protect its firms’ operation in the host country. Colonialism was the 
manifestation of this kind. Although colonialism historically promoted a more “integrated” global market 
because of the political power imposed by, for example, British Empire, on its colonies contributed to 
reduced institutional risk for British and other European investors (Schularick & Steger, 2008), it does not 
change the fact that colonialism was an affront to freedom and dignity. More importantly to the purpose 
of our research, the current lack of global governance affirms that a unilateral political power is no 
substitute to equitable and enduring global governance. The irony, in fact, is that it is precisely the weak 
global governance that provided and will continue to provide a fertile ground for powerful nations to 
exert their influence in international business. Since the exercise of political power naturally brings about 
a commitment problem, whoever holds the power, it may be to predatory governments’ interest to 
improve their property rights standard so that they will not fall victim to more powerful foreign 
governments. Our findings of the effectiveness of using political and economic power to curb the risk of 
poor governance only highlight the vital importance of establishing global governance structure for FDI 
so that all nation states will abide by a same set of rules governing FDI, eliminating privileges as well as 
opportunism.  
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We discuss the limits of our work. First, we use state ownership as a strong proxy of political power, but 
this is a static attribute. Future studies can extend this by examining how initial political advantages foster 
further political strategies which may strengthen or hinder SOEs’ market positions in risky environments. 
Questions can be asked about how firms balance the building up of their market and non-market based 
competences to sustain their internationalization. This way, the enquiry will move from a static efficiency 
comparison between SOEs and private firms, which has been done in a largely body of literature (e.g. 
Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001; Shirley & Walsh, 2001), to a more profound question of why SOEs remains 
active not only in more national markets, but are increasingly found in global marketplace despite their 
low efficiency. Another weakness of our analysis is that our firm-level information is limited. Future 
studies can use questionnaire survey to obtain more detailed firm information to improve our analysis. 
Thirdly, we have placed our study in the Chinese context. The generalization of our findings can be 
improved if future studies analyse outward FDI from both authoritative and democratic regimes because, 
arguably, the effect of politics on FDI might depend on a country’s regime type (Dixit, 2005; Aidt & 
Gassebner, 2010).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the main variables and their definitions 
 
 Variables Measurement  Source  Mean SD. Min. Max. 
Dependent variable        
FDI  The natural log of the amount of investment (million US$)  This study 7.86 2.07 0.03 13.34 
Independent variables       
SOE % of state ownership This study 0.24 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Expropriation risk Private property protection index; higher values indicate higher risk Heritage index 41.50 27.05 5.00 95.00 
Political relations Political relations between China and host countries. Higher values indicate better relations Gartzke 2008 0.49 0.45 -0.72 0.98 
Export dependence % of export to China as total export IMF 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.64 
Control variables        
GDP The natural log of the GDP in current US$ World Bank 26.86 1.97 19.34 30.29 
GDP per head The natural log of the GDP per head in current US$ World Bank 9.18 1.61 4.97 11.30 
Corporate tax The highest corporate rate applied in the country World Bank 26.15 19.54 5.00 45.75 
Unemployment % of total unemployment ILO 6.76 3.69 0.50 31.20 
Natural resource % of metal and ore in country’s total export World Bank 5.97 10.03 0.00 85.37 
Exchange rate Real exchange rate IMF 101.77 18.97 80.17 597.36 
Distance The natural log of air miles between  Beijing and foreign capital city On-line distance calculator 8.00 1.13 3.24 9.39 
Fixed assets The natural log of total fixed assets (10,000 Yuan) This study 160.44 15.46 30.91 200.37 
Age Number of years since operation  This study 11.56 9.38 0.00 84.00 
Profit Profit per employee in Yuan This study 358081 2132552 -539093 30600000 
Export  Export per employee in Yuan This study 161680 495164 0.00 8231394 
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Table 2: Correlations matrix of key variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 FDI  1.0000                
2 SOE 0.1885 1.0000                
3 Expropriation risk -0.3963* -0.1603 1.0000               
4 Export dependence 0.1851* 0.0930* 0.1313* 1.0000              
5 Political relations 0.1667* 0.1636* 0.4756* 0.1252 1.0000             
6 GDP -0.2556 -0.2243* -0.6115* -0.1772* -0.7081* 1.0000            
7 GDP per capita -0.3975* -0.1251* -0.7001* 0.0438 -0.6512* 0.6535*   1.0000          
8 Corporate tax  -0.0391 -0.0654 -0.1859* -0.2143* -0.0023 0.1086* -0.2230* 1.0000          
9 Unemployment 0.0383 -0.0336 0.1195* -0.1966* 0.0562* -0.0806*  -0.0713* 0.1568* 1.0000         
10 Natural resource  0.0895* 0.1507* 0.0967* 0.1053* 0.1131* -0.2722* -0.2041* -0.1288* 0.3390* 1.0000        
11 Exchange rate 0.0811* 0.0463 0.2328* 0.2672* 0.2864* -0.1672* -0.1801* 0.4101* -0.0224 0.0482 1.0000       
12 Distance 
 
0.0654 -0.0264 -0.0552* -0.4636* -0.3637* 0.2372*   0.0062 0.2981* 0.2894* 0.1232* -0.0498 1.0000      
13 Fixed assets 0.1324* 0.2897* 0.1994* 0.0118 0.1730* -0.2013* -0.1380* 0.0287 0.0584 0.0376 0.0234 0.0251 1.0000     
14 Profit 0.2076* 0.1972* -0.0018 0.0128 0.0299 -0.0425   -0.0129 -0.0553 -0.0531 -0.0234 0.0336 0.0209 0.1742* 1.0000     
15 Export 0.0948* -0.2204* -0.0554 -0.0550 -0.0926* 0.0962*   0.0966* 0.0583 0.0319 -0.0028 -0.0122 0.0990* 0.0815 -0.0294  1.0000   
16. Age -0.0632 -0.0885* 0.0712* -0.0544 -0.0102 -0.0171   -0.0662* -0.0331 0.0831* 0.0701* -0.0076 0.0181 0.2567* -0.0396 0.034 1.0000 
Note: N=894 observations;  * p<0.05 
* p<0.05, 
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Table 3: Expropriation risk and SOEs 
 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Full sample Full sample Full sample Full sample 
Expropriation risk -0.019* -0.025* -0.021* -0.020* 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
State ownership    -0.318 -0.299 
   (0.904) (0.890) 
Expropriation risk*state ownership   0.016* 0.016* 
(0.007) (0.006) 
Fixed assets 0.116** 0.080* 0.106** 0.072 
 (0.036) (0.040) (0.038) (0.042) 
Age -0.001 -0.007 0.001 -0.006 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Profitability 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Export 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log GDP  0.092 0.087 0.122 0.105 
 (0.078) (0.076) (0.079) (0.078) 
Log GDP per capita -0.588** -0.546** -0.580** -0.571** 
 (0.189) (0.192) (0.192) (0.196) 
Corporate total tax -0.002 -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Unemployment rate -0.071** -0.056* -0.066* -0.054* 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) 
Natural resource 0.003 -0.003 -0.000 -0.006 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Exchange rate 0.004** 0.004** 0.012** 0.010* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) 
Distance 0.118 0.120 0.149 0.155 
 (0.216) (0.216) (0.216) (0.218) 
Constant 3.313 3.518 1.885 2.244 
 (2.879) (3.539) (2.951) (3.617) 
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 24.1% 34.4% 26.2% 38.7% 
N 894 812 894      812 
Notes: The dependent variable is natural log of FDI. All independent variables are one year lagged. 
VIFs are below 6.25 in all models.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4: Expropriation risk, political relations, and SOEs 
 
 
 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Full sample Full sample SOEs Non-SOEs 
Expropriation risk -0.021* -0.019* 0.009* -0.022* 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011) 
Political relations 1.468 0.648 0.635* 0.236 
 (0.830) (0.643) (0.311) (0.536) 
Expropriation risk*Political relaitons 0.028** 
(0.008) 
0.014** 
(0.004) 
0.041*** 
(0.008) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
Fixed assets 0.110** 0.076 -0.210 0.070 
 (0.036) (0.040) (0.184) (0.044) 
Age -0.002 -0.008 0.006 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.010) 
Profitability 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.005** 0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Export 0.005*** 0.007*** -0.000 0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log GDP  -0.097 -0.034 0.241 -0.082 
 (0.105) (0.103) (0.290) (0.116) 
Log GDP per capita -0.322 -0.421 -0.932 -0.311 
 (0.233) (0.232) (0.730) (0.271) 
Corporate total tax 0.005 -0.001 0.029 -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.028) (0.010) 
Unemployment rate -0.067* -0.053* -0.089 -0.028 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.052) (0.036) 
Natural resource 0.010 -0.001 0.011 -0.007 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.028) (0.027) 
Exchange rate 0.003 0.012* 0.031* 0.008* 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.013) (0.003) 
Distance -0.259 -0.121 -0.874 0.076 
 (0.264) (0.266) (0.695) (0.309) 
Constant 6.307 6.301 8.635 8.452 
 (5.522) (6.244) (9.928) (5.814) 
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 25.2% 38.3% 36.5% 40.8% 
N 894 810 268 502 
Notes:  The dependent variable is natural log of FDI. All independent variables are one year lagged. 
VIFs are below 7.03 in all models. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5: Expropriation risk, export dependence, and SOEs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Full sample Full sample SOEs Non-SOEs 
Expropriation risk -0.021* -0.027* 0.015* -0.029* 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) 
Export dependence 1.750 1.395 1.261 1.725 
 (1.650) (1.508) (1.434) (0.925) 
Expropriation risk*Export dependence -0.032 
(0.106) 
-0.057 
(0.067) 
0.075* 
(0.027) 
-0.063 
(0.073) 
Fixed assets 0.114** 0.077 -0.180 0.085* 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.211) (0.041) 
Age -0.000 -0.007 0.004 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.009) 
Profitability  0.009*** 0.008*** 0.003** 0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Export  0.007*** 0.012*** -0.000 0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log GDP  0.040 0.059 0.166 0.050 
 (0.086) (0.088) (0.236) (0.102) 
Log GDP per capita -0.534** -0.523** -1.061** -0.392 
 (0.194) (0.180) (0.362) (0.210) 
Corporate total tax 0.000 -0.005 0.027 -0.010 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.024) (0.011) 
Unemployment rate -0.069* -0.053* -0.053 -0.041 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.038) (0.038) 
Natural resource 0.001 -0.006 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.030) 
Exchange rate 0.005 0.011* 0.039** 0.010* 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.013) (0.004) 
Distance 0.328 0.253 0.144 0.308 
 (0.260) (0.252) (0.652) (0.310) 
Constant 2.160 2.852 7.353 0.482 
 (2.991) (3.326) (9.538) (3.652) 
Year fixed effects  No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 24.1% 36.9% 34.0% 39.5% 
N 890 810 268 502 
Notes: The dependent variable is natural log of FDI. All independent variables are one year lagged. 
VIFs are below 6.21 in all models. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 6: Expropriation risk, political relations, export dependence, and SOEs  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Full sample Full sample Full sample 
Expropriation risk -0.011* -0.010* -0.009* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
State ownership -0.217 -0.195 -0.485 
 (0.988) (0.979) (1.132) 
Expropriation risk*state ownership 0.027* 
(0.013) 
0.029* 
(0.013) 
0.032* 
(0.015) 
Political relations (PR) 1.095 1.548 0.571 
 (1.823) (1.841) (1.886) 
Expropriation risk*PR 0.018* 
(0.007) 
0.020* 
(0.010) 
0.023* 
(0.008) 
Expropriation risk*PR*state ownership  0.043* 
(0.016) 
0.047* 
(0.023) 
0.055* 
(0.019) 
Export dependence (ED) 4.101 1.605 0.365 
 (9.841) (10.409) (9.759) 
Expropriation risk*ED -0.056 
(0.125) 
-0.038 
(0.130) 
-0.026 
(0.124) 
Expropriation risk*ED*state ownership  0.181 
(0.150) 
0.187 
(0.149) 
0.103* 
(0.041) 
Fixed assets 0.097** 0.078* 0.062 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.041) 
Age -0.001 -0.000 -0.009 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Profitability  0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Export  0.005*** 0.006*** 0.0010*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log GDP  -0.084 -0.060 -0.037 
 (0.121) (0.123) (0.123) 
Log GDP per capita -0.319 -0.261 -0.447 
 (0.251) (0.264) (0.258) 
Corporate total tax 0.000 -0.000 -0.004 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Unemployment rate -0.056* -0.057* -0.041 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) 
Natural resource 0.003 0.005 -0.007 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Exchange rate 0.010* 0.004** 0.007* 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) 
Distance -0.135 -0.280 -0.083 
 (0.421) (0.439) (0.416) 
Constant 6.790 7.459 6.960 
 (4.261) (4.634) (4.368) 
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes 
R-squared 29.1% 31.5% 42.3% 
N 894 810 810 
Notes: The dependent variable is natural log of FDI. All independent variables are one year 
lagged. VIFs are below 10.84 in all models.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Graph 1: Moderation effect of state ownership 
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Graph 2: Moderation effect of political relations 
 
Graph 3:  Moderation effect of political relations for SOEs Graph 4:  Moderation effect of political relations for non-SOEs 
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Graph 5: Moderation effect of export dependence: non-significant 
 
Graph 6: Moderation effect of export dependence for SOEs Graph 7: Moderation effect of export dependence for non-SOEs: non-significant 
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Endnotes: 
1. For example, Fu (2008) reported that China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) received a 
government subsidies of 12.3 billion Yuan ($1.74 billion) to cover refining losses in 2008, which 
constituted a third consecutive year for its getting a huge cash injection in state compensation. Unirule, a 
Chinese think-tank, estimated that not having to pay for the land they occupy was a subsidy to SOEs 
worth some 4 trillion Yuan ($640 billion) between 2001 and 2009. In 2009 alone, about 85% of China’s 
$1.4 trillion in bank loans went to SOEs (Economist, 2012). This evidence poses a serious question of 
how long the Chinese state, regardless how deep its pocket is, can endure the SOEs’ slow burn of the 
country’s wealth.   
2. To reduce data loss in our sample, we use the average score for 2008 and 2007 to estimate a score for 
political relations of 2009, because the data from Gartzke (2008) ends in 2008. 
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